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DUE PROCESS OF ECONOMY:
A PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED STATES ECONOMY COURT
LUIS KUTNER*
THE PROBLEM
The power struggle between labor and management, involving all
classes of people, is going on with renewed effort and ever enlarging
significance. A defeat of either side causes a curious social consciousness,
a kind of humiliation, which does not subside when a labor-management
contract is concluded. It is merely a respite for the renewing of efforts
for studied intolerance of the public welfare amid conflict or confusion.
Under the cloak of compromise, each side substitutes coercive absolutism
with little comprehension of the due process standards of economy.
Positive solutions are sought by negative means.
The future of industrial and social progress owes much to the growth
of cumulative knowledge and to the increasing ability of men in arriving
at flexible standards that will enable a rule of law distribution and participa-
tion in the material wealth that is produced. There is nothing vague
about the way in which all this happens or about the moving forces that
push the American industrial economy from one stage to a higher one.
Belief in the progress of democratic processes in a continuing complex
society presupposes that there can be no boycott on new ideas. A dispute
over the jobs of sixty-two men should not be allowed to disrupt the personal
and business lives of hundreds of thousands of people, causing incalculable
losses and inconvenience. The New York harbor strike halted traffic on
two essential railroads. Angry reactions that "there ought to be a law,"
that, "This is a serious strike that should be settled in the public interest,"'
did not prevent paralyzing and massive disruptions of commerce.
* Member, Illinois Bar; President, Commission For International Due Process of
Law; Author of Proposals of WORLD HABEAS CORPus, HABEAS PROPRIETATUM; former
Visiting Lecturer and Associate Professor, Yale Law School. Assistance of Robert Smith,
University of Chicago, is acknowledged.
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1961, p. 12, Sec. of Labor Arthur 1. Goldberg's comments
on the seeking of labor peace in the New York harbor strike.
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Any power which may significantly affect the health and safety of
a nation's economy must not be immune from legal accountability. The
fact has been demonstrated repeatedly that labor leaders and industrialists
possess just such power. A striking illustration of this is the invocation
of the national emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act'& on sixteen
occasions within twelve years.2 These strikes which precipitated the applica-
tion of the emergency provisions result, of course, from the failure of
both labor and management to devise a settlement. However, the union
is saddled with the onus of economic disruption simply because the union
takes the first formal and manifest action in the economic battle.
As Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg has stated:
The injunction provision [of the Taft-Hartley Act] is based on
the false assumption that management has nothing to do with
causing big strikes .... In the steel dispute [of 1959], management
expected the injunction to be used and that great expectation
served to frustrate the collective bargaining process from the
beginning. It is certainly clear today that the steel industry's
reliance on a prospective injunction, which would force employees
to return to work under expired conditions of employment made
settlement at the collective bargaining table far more difficult
than it would otherwise have been.3
Another writer has said that, "to allocate the sole responsibility for
the strikes to Unions is like assigning the responsibility for a war to the
first party to issue a formal declaration or to fire a shot, regardless of
preceding events. ' 4
The power envisaged here is not solely the power to disrupt the economy
by work-stoppages in strategic industries. This is especially true in an
interrelated economy like our own where every disturbance has the effect
of a stone dropped into a still pool of water. In 1959, approximately 3700
]a. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 206, 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1958).
2. See Cox, Strikes 6 the 'Public Interest: A Proposal for New Legislation, 205
A'rLANrIc MONTHLY 48 (1960).
3. Goldberg, The Role of the Labor Union in an Age of Bigness, 55 Nw. U.L.
Rwv. 54, 57-58 (1960). The Secretary of Labor has also said that, "What is wrong is
not that Congress has acted to assert the public interest, but that the method selected
by Congress has been wrong. Simply stated, the Taft-Hartley injunction method is
one-sided and it does not hell) to settle the underlying dispute. It is therefore, not a
good method. I am grateful that at least one dividend of the long steel controversy
has been the widespread recognition that the Taft-Flartley injunction method is
unsatisfactory. The President, Secretary Mitchell, Chairman George Taylor of the
Board of Inquiry in the steel dispute, other public officials, labor relations experts and
large sections of the press have demonstrated their lack of faith in the national
emergency injunction provisions." Id. at 57. Another writer has criticized the provisions
on the ground that they "do not operate until after a national emergency dispute
has occurred." Taylor, The Adequacy of Taft-Hartley in Public Emergency Disputes,
333 Annals 76 (1961). For an additional criticism see Rebmus, The Operation of the
National Emergency Provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 62
YALE L.J. 1047 (1953). See generally Warren, National Emergency Provisions, 4 LAB.
L.J. 130 (1953).
4. Taylor, supra note 3, at 91.
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disputes resulted in work-stoppages. These industrial conflicts involved a
total of 69,000,000 lost man days.5 In 1958, the figures were 3694 and
23,900,000 respectively." In 1960, the time lost due to work-stoppages was
considerably less.7 Moreover, the public interest is also affected by means
other than actual work-stoppages. Power may also be exercised in large
sectors of the economy by means of more subtle forms of coercive bargaining.
At present, the United States possesses inadequate legal safeguards
against those arbitrary and unilateral decisions which precipitate these
industrial disputes. Prevailing concepts of collective bargaining merely
require the parties to confer on certain subjects and to evince a desire
to agree.8 The major legal restraint on the parties' bargaining power today
is that an offer should not be so arbitrary or manifestly unfair as to evince
a desire not to reach an agreement.9 Presumably this results in an attempt
by a party with superior bargaining power to impose demands upon
his weaker adversary without regard to standards of fairness and justice
which are so vital in other areas of our law.10 At present, it appears that
public opinion, rather than rules of law, is the chief restraint on the
demands of the parties. The fear that certain aspects of these disputes will
generate a public demand for regulatory legislation plays an undetermined
role in the collective bargaining process. The implications from the fact
that reliance on legal sanctions, rather than public opinion, in other areas
of public interest leads to the conclusion that these safeguards are
inadequate.
This article submits a proposal to rectify present inadequacies by
the application of concepts of due process of law to labor-management
disputes., This approach aims at equitable and peaceful industrial relations
by means of Due Process of Economy. The premise of Due Process of
Economy is that the public interest is paramount and may best be served
by replacing what is primarily a rule of force with a rule of law. The plan
5. 1959 Statistical Supplement, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW at 58.
6. Ibid.
7. Only two hours out of every 1000 available work-time hours were lost as a
result of the inability of employers and unions to agree. New York Times, Jan. 6, 1961.
In February of 1961, an insignificant wildcat walkout of a few Flight Engineers on
Overseas Airlines in New York, ballooned into the most staggering and crippling
United States Airlines strike in history. It was not a strike against employers but
against a ruling by an agency of the United States government, and all because the
Flight Engineers International Association feared that through that ruling they might
lose their jobs in the cockpits to pilots. The seven striking airlines, American,
Pan American, Trans-World, Eastern, Western and Flying Tigers, lost forty million
dollars in business and the 84,000 non-striking employees, which had to be furloughed,
lost millions more in wages. Families had to dip heavily into their reserve capital.
Miami.tourist business lost three million dollars a day and estimates reached as high
as twenty-five million dollars for the 12-day strike.
8. Consult textual discussion accompanying footnote 46 infra.
9. Ibid.
10. Obviously, there are limitations on the club held by the party in the superior
bargaining position. For instance, even the weakest employer is not likely to give in to
such unreasonable demands that his prices would be clearly unable to meet those
of competition. However, within. limits, there appears to be room for extensive
pressure by the stronger party.
1,961]
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requires the creation of a United States Economy Court in each existing
federal circuit.
SCOPE OF PROPOSAL FOR DUE PROCESS OF ECONOMY
In Part I of this paper, by way of introduction, the concept of consti-
tutional due process of law will be described as a background for this
particular inquiry. In Part II, it is proposed first to review the history which
led to the commitment to collective bargaining, and, also, to describe
the present legal framework within which it operates. In Part III some
inadequacies of the present statutory scheme will be pointed out. Finally,
in Part IV, more details of the proposal for Due Process of Economy
will be given. Its relation to, and effect upon, the existing framework
in the United States will also be discussed.
PART I
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Since the law cannot compel the spirit of brotherhood, can "due
process" become the ligament of law between the constitution, the labor
union and governmental action?' Due process of law has undergone an
evolutionary process of expansion. 1 The term, "due process of law," comes
to us from chapter three of Edward III (1355).12 In the earlier years
of its development, the phrase had only procedural significance.' 3 Today,
in the United States, due process of law continues to insulate many
procedural rights of the individual from the growing power of the state.
But due process also has a profound impact on substantive law, both
federal and state, as well. 14
The perpetual process of development indicates the futility of attempt-
ing to find a concrete definition for the concept. Perhaps the touchstone
is that the meaning of due process must be determined only by a "gradual
process of inclusion or exclusion."' 15 Justice Cardozo suggested that this
process "has not been arbitrary or casual. It has been dictated by a study
and appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications, of liberty
itself."16
11. Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union and Governmental Action,
70 YALE L.J. 345, 375 (1961).
1 Ia. See generally Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-
A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957). See also Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 603 (1959).
12. "No man of what state or condition he be, shall be put out of his lands or
tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, or put to death, without he be brought to
answer by due process of law." 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1355).
13. For a historical description of the phrase "due process" see LEGISLATIVE
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 971-80 (Corwin ed. 19'2).
14. Cases dealing with racial discrimination and interstate commerce are illustrative
of substantive due process.
15. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
16. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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A partial explanation of the ephemeral nature of due process lies in
the fact that the majorities of the Supreme Court have adhered to the
"flexible" or "natural law" theory of due process.17 The growth of this
principle has been attributed, in part, to. the Supreme Court's appeal
to a "higher law." The subject of such an appeal is embodied in an
inarticulated set of lofty principles, not made by the mind of man. The
constitutional requirement of due process of law has become the instrument
for the application of this philosophy regarding the power of the state
both to regulate and to experiment with procedural innovations.' 8
In Hurtado v. California, flexible due process was identified with
"those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions."'19 Justice Frankfurter, the chief
adherent of a natural law theory of due process in the present Supreme
Court, stated, "Due process is compounded of history, reason, the past
course of decisions, and the stout confidence in the strength of the
democratic faith which we possess."20
These broad statements reflect the backdrop against which a particular
fact situation is examined. For "what is due process of law depends on
the circumstances. It varies with the subject matter and the necessities
of the situation. 121 In the last analysis, it is the particular factual matrix
of fair play which determines whether a given.process will be due process.
Thus, due process appears to be the analytical tool used by the courts to
bring principles of fairness to bear on a particular situation.
PART II
THE STRUGGLE FOR UNION RECOGNITION
2 2
The exploitation of the laboring classes has written an unenviable
chapter in the history of the English-speaking people. The result of these
unfortunate conditions was the genesis of labor unions. Samuel Gompers
viewed labor unions as "organizations of necessity. They were born of the
17. See MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926). The competing theory is that
of "fixed" due process. Proponents of this theory believe that the meaning of due
process must be derived from historical intent as is manifest in objectively verifiable
data. Justice Black is the present proponent of this view. In Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947), Justice Black, in dissent, stated that "fTlhe 'natural law'
formula . . . should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our Constitution."
Justice Black reasoned, in part, that the natural law formula, "has been used in the
past, and can be used in the future, to license this Court, in considering regulatory
legislation to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and to trespass,
all too freely, on the legislative domain of the States as well as the Federal Government."
Adamson v. California, supra at 90.
18. See Kadish, supra note 11.
19. 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
20. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
21. LECISLATIVE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF TIlE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1070 (Corwin ed. 1952).
22. For an excellent survey of the labor problem, see Note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAW
654 (1960).
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necessity of workers to protect and defend themselves from encroachment,
injustice and wrong." 28 Of course, the rise of organized labor met the
expected resistance of the non-working classes.
The conspiracy doctrine and the labor injunction were the primary
devices used to restrict the influence of unions. The classic criminal con-
spiracy case is the Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case24 decided in 1806,
wherein recorder Levy said, "A combination of workmen to raise their
wages may be considered from a twofold point of view; one is to benefit
themselves, the other is to injure those who do not join their society.
The rule of law condemns them both. ' 2 This doctrine was widely
applied26 until its repudiation in Commonwealth v. Hunt.27
Criminal prosecutions for conspiracy became infrequent solely because
the injunction emerged as the usual form of action in labor disputes. While
the precise date of the first labor injunction remains unknown, Sherry v.
Perkins28 and United States v. Debs29 are usually cited as being the first.
The use of the injunction in labor disputes was sustained primarily on
the ground that it prevented irreparable damage to property.30 Courts of
equity used a similar reason as a justification for granting injunctive relief.
An extension of the definition of property to include the right to do business
was necessitated by the use of the injunction in labor law.3' By 1931, the
labor injunction had been issued 1972 times.32
The Sherman Act,33 passed in 1890, declared combinations in restraint
of trade to be illegal. By 1893, a district court held that Congress "made
the interdiction include combinations of labor, as well as of capital. '34 In
1908, the Supreme Court sanctioned a similar construction of this act.35
The Clayton Act30 was hailed as the Magna Carta of labor. Section 20,
in part, provided that no injunction should issue in a labor dispute unless
it was necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property. This exemption
of labor unions from anti-monopoly laws had little immediate impact on
the growth of unions. In only three of thirteen reported cases between
1916 and 1920 was the use of the injunction denied.3 7 The other ten cases
23. COMPERS, LABOR AND TIE COMMON WELFARE 6 (1919).
24. 3 COMMONS & GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 59, 233 (1910).
25. Id. at 67.
26. GRECORY & KATZ, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS & COMMENTS 19 (1948).
27. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
28. 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888).
29. 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. 111. 1894), aff'd sub nom. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895.
• See generally FRANKFURTER & GREENE, TIlE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
31. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 834 (1926).
32. WITTE, TIlE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES 84 (1932).
33. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
34. United States v. Workmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994, 996
(E.D. La.), aff'd, 57 Fed. 85 (5th Cir. 1893).
35. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
36. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1958).
37. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 30, at 165.
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gave limited definition to the term "labor dispute," while broadly inter-
preting "irreparable injury" to property. The tenor of these cases was
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering.3a An injunction was sought to restrain a machinists' union and
affiliated unions from maintaining a secondary boycott against the plaintiff's
distributors and retailers. The district court39 dismissed the bill and the
court of appeals affirmed.40 However, the Supreme Court reversed on the
ground of an irreparable injury to an employer's business. The Supreme
Court also held that section 20 applied only to employees and not to
the machinists who were not affiliated with the plaintiff. Many states passed
similar statutes which were construed in like manner.41
In 1926, labor received sorely needed aid from the federal government
in the form of the Railway Labor Act.42 Prepared by both management
and labor, this legislation was based on the theory that peaceful industrial
relations could be attained through voluntary arbitration and mediation
of disputes. Collective bargaining was embodied in a clause which stated:
"It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to
exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. .... ,,43
The Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act44 can properly be regarded
as a response to the narrow construction of previous statutes. This act,
unlike the Clayton Act, broadly defined labor disputes and set out specific
union activity which could not be thwarted by the use of a labor injunction.
The effect of this act was to curb successfully the use of the injunction by
federal courts in labor disputes. 45
The New Deal and Labor Union Power
46
Collective bargaining was extended to all industries in the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.4t Section 7(a) provided that:
[E]mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be
free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers or
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives
or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 48
38. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
39. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 247 Fed. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
40. 252 Fed. 722 (2d Cir. 1918).
41. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 30, at 181.
42. 44 Stat. 597 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-88 (1958).
43. 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
44. 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
45. See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
46. See generally Stern, The Commerce Clause & the National Economy, 1933-1946,
59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).
47. 48 Stat. 195 (1935).
48. 48 Stat. 198 (1935).
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Although the NIRA was declared unconstitutional,49 it existed long
enough to act as a stimulus to trade union activity. 50
The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) 51 replaced the
NIRA. The premise of the Wagner Act was the belief "that free opportunity
for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to
promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agree-
ments which the act in itself does not attempt to compel. '52
Section 7 of the Wagner Act carried over the provisions of section 7(a)
of the NIRA. This section insured the rights of employees to organize and
bargain collectively through freely chosen representatives, and to engage
in concerted activity. This section can properly be regarded as the heart
of the statute. In an effort to protect the rights of employees granted
in section 7, certain prohibited acts were enumerated in section 8.
Section 8(a) (5) provides that it shall be an unfair ]abor practice
"for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees . . . ."5 In light of the purposes of the act, Congress
did not seem to appreciate the difficulties involved in the application of
such a provision. Senator Wagner's attitude is indicative. He stated that
section 8(a)(5) "does not compel anyone to make a compact of any
kind if no terms are arrived at that are satisfactory to him. The very essence
of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to withdraw
if its conditions are not met.15 4
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor said:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they
have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to
escort them to the door of their employer and say, 'Here they are,
the legal representatives of your employees.' What happens behind
those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to
inquire into it.55
It soon became evident that industrial peace would not be effectuated
if the law merely required the parties to confer. Some legal standards
had to be imposed upon the quality and content of the negotiations,
because, in too many cases, management met with labor only to "talk it
to death." In order to prohibit sham negotiations, section 8(a) (5) has
been interpreted to require a sincere desire to reach an agreement. In
Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, the court said:
49. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 459 (1935).
50. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, announced
on October 1, 1933, that his union's membership had increased 1,300,000 since the
passage of the NIRA. N. Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1933, p. 1.
51. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1958).
52. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
53. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1958).
54. 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935).
55. 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935).
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While the act does not compel that employer and employees shall
agree, it contemplates that agreements will be reached as the result
of collective bargaining. It obligates the employer to bargain in
good faith both collectively and exclusively with the chosen
representatives of a majority of his employees. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
There are, of course, certain difficulties inherent in applying the
subjective standard of good faith. The National Labor Relations Board
and the reviewing courts have the problem of determining the mental
status of the parties under such a test. Usually such a determination must
be based upon inferences drawn from a host of often contradictory
activities by members of the parties concerned. However, certain acts have
been held evidence of bad faith: an employer's refusal to recognize a
union supported by a majority of his employees; 57 setting conditions for
the commencement of negotiations; '8 a refusal to make counter-offers; 9
sending negotiators who do not have the authority to complete negotiations; 60
repeatedly shifting position during negotiations;61 and organizing campaigns
directed -against the union.62
Presumably, the difficulties involved in applying this subjective standard
of good faith have led the NLRB to isolate specific actions and label
them violations, per se, of the duty to bargain in good faith. The most
common violations per se are a refusal to put an agreement in writing
63
and the unilateral granting of wage increases or other concessions during
negotiations.64
Statistics reflect the full impact of the Wagner Act. From 1935-1947,
union membership increased from 4 million to approximately 15 million.
65
Coupled with this rise in union strength was a growing belief by some
that the Wagner Act was one-sided in that it did not list any unfair labor
practices on the part of labor. It was only a matter of time before such
a belief was reflected in amendments to the Wagner Act.
As the passage of the amendments would suggest, the Wagner Act
failed to produce industrial harmony by a reduction of labor disputes.
During World War II, there were over 13,000 strikes.66 Moreover, in
1946, the first year of international military peace, the United States was
56. 115 F.2d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1940). See generally Smith, The Evolution of the
"Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1065 (1941).
57. NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1944).
58. NLRB v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1948).
59. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
60. Great So. Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1942).
61. Franklin Hosiery Mills, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 276 (1949).
62. NLRB v. Century Oxford Mfg. Corp., 140 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1944).
63. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).
64. Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942).
65. McNAUGHTON & LAZAR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT
154 (1954).
66. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF TIlE UNITED STATES 263, 273 (1958).
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besieged by industrial strife. In that year alone, there were approximately
5000 strikes which cost the country 116 million lost man-hours.67 In
1947, work-stoppages cost the American public an additional 34 million
man-hours. 68
Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Wagner Act
The amendments to the Wagner Act took the form of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley). 69 Although many factors induced
the legislation, there appears to be no doubt that "the authors of the
Taft-Hartley Act proceeded on the premise that labor unions had become
too powerful and that it was therefore necessary to bring about a new
balance of power in the collective-bargaining process. ' 70
While Congress apparently sought to restrict the power of labor by
passing the Taft-Hartley Act, it certainly did not abandon the national
commitment to collective bargaining as the appropriate means for settling
industrial disputes. Essentially, the process was to remain a voluntary give
and take. However, now there was to be more governmental assistance.
Section 7 was extended to guarantee employees the right to refrain
from union activities. Perhaps this change was motivated by beliefs such as
Senator Taft's statement to the effect "that if bargaining power could be
equalized, many of the industrial-relations problems . . .would tend to
disappear through the action of collective bargaining."71 These 1947 amend-
ments regulate subject matter 72 and procedure.73 They also limit the
economic weapons which a union may use in achieving its desires.74 The
act provided for unfair labor practices on the part of labor which correspond
to those originally imposed on management. Section 8(b) (3) established
that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a union "to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his
employees subject to the provisions of Section 9(a). . ..75
After an exhaustive study of the Taft-Hartley Act, Professor Cox
concluded:
Despite its great importance, the Wagner Act dealt with only a
narrow segment of industrial relations. The Act prevented employers
from interfering in the organizational activities of employees and
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as LMRA].
70. McNAUGHITON & LAZAR, op. cit. supra note 65, at 154.
71. Id. at 159.
72. LMRA §§ 7, 8(a)(3) prohibit the negotiating of a closed shop provision. For
a competent treatment of government regulations of the subject matter of collective
bargaining, see Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REV. 389 (1950).
73. LMRA § 8(d) (1) requires that a union must give 60 days notice of its intent
to terminate the contract.
74. LMRA § 8(b)(4) attempted to make secondary boycotts illegal.
75. LMRA § 8(b)(3).
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labor unions. It required them to recognize and bargain with a
union designated as representative by a majority of the employees
in an appropriate unit. Beyond this the Wagner Act left collective
bargaining to develop freely without government intervention. The
Taft-Hartley Act restricts the conduct of employers, employees,
and Labor unions, both before and after the establishment of
collective bargaining relationships. Thus, it is a major step into a
new field of federal regulation. 76
The regulatory increase, implicit in the Taft-Hartley Act was paralleled,
if not exceeded, by the NLRB's construction of section 8(a) (5) and
labor's counterpart, section 8(b) (3). It soon became apparent that, although
professing to use the rubric of good faith, the Board did not always
consider a sincere desire to reach an agreement sufficient to comply with
the statutory duty to bargain. In the Truitt Mfg. Co. case, the NLRB
stated that "it is settled law, that when an employer seeks to justify
the refusal of a wage increase upon an economic basis . . . good-faith
bargaining under the Act requires that upon request the employer attempt
to substantiate its economic position by reasonable proof." 77 An American
Bar Association report states that the Truitt case "appears to reflect an
attempt to proscribe bargaining practices deemed incompatible with reasoned
discussion. ' 17 (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the NLRB has ruled that a
slowdown sponsored by the union during negotiations is irreconcilable with
the statutory duty to bargain in good faith.79 The Board's regulation of
bargaining tactics of unions was extended in subsequent cases.8 0 Solicitor-
General Cox, then Professor Cox, was quick to point out that these actions
by both employers and employees were entirely consistent with a desire
to reach agreement.8 ' In this line of cases, then, the NLRB appears to
demonstrate two things: first, that the NLRB feels that the present
statutory safeguards embodied in the good faith rule are inadequate to
protect the public interest; second, the NLRB, under the guise of following
the statutory formula, is legislating in an attempt to overcome its present
inadequacies.
In recognition of these factors, the Supreme Court apparently has
extended this line of cases. In the Insurance Agents' Int'l Union 2 case,
the Board relied on Personal Products,82a in holding that a union's use of
76. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 274, 312-13 (1948).
77. Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), aff'd, 351 U.S. 149 (1956),
reversing 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955). See generally Feinsinger, The National Labor
Relations Act and Collective Bargaining, 57 MICH. L. REV. 807 (1959).
78. Section of Labor Relations Law, Report of the Committee on Development of
the Law Under the National Labor Relations Act, 84 A.B.A. REP. 68 (1959).
79. Textile Workers Union of America, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), rev'd, 227
F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956).
80. International Union, UMW, 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957); International Union,
UMW, 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957).
81. See Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
82. 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957).
82a. Textile Union Workers of America, supra note 79.
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harassing tactics during negotiations is fundamentally inconsistent with the
statutory bargaining requirement even if the union did sincerely wish to
reach an agreement. In affirming the court of appeals,83 the Supreme
Court stated that the Board's view was incorrect because "there is
simply no inconsistency between the application of economic pressure
and good-faith collective bargaining." 84 The Court was of the view that
the Board cannot "in the guise of determining good or bad faith in
negotiations . . .", regulate the parties' choices of economic weapons;
for to do so might be giving the Board leverage to alter the relative
power of the adversaries and thus affect the substantive terms of the
agreement. However, the Court was not unsympathetic with the Board's
attempt to regulate the economic weapons and thus foster "reasoned
discussion." As it stated:
It is suggested here that the time has come for a reevaluation of
the basic content of collective bargaining as contemplated by
the federal legislation. But that is for Congress. Congress has
demonstrated its capacity to adjust the Nation's labor legislation
to what, in its legislative judgment, constitutes the statutory pattern
appropriate to the developing state of labor relations in the
country. Major revisions of the basic statute were enacted in
1947 and 1959. To be sure, then, Congress might be of the
opinion that greater stress should be put on the role of 'pure'
negotiation in settling labor disputes, to the extent of eliminating
more and more economic weapons from the parties' grasp, and
perhaps it might start with the ones involved here; or on considera-
tion of the alternatives, it might shrink from such an undertaking.
But Congress' policy has not yet moved to this point, and with
only section 8(b) (3) to lean on, we do not see how the Board
can do so on its own.86
Ancillary Devices Supplementing Collective Bargaining
Leaving the parties relatively free to arrive at their own solution
does not always achieve a result consonant with the best interests of the
public. Consequently, several ancillary devices have been born. These
processes aim either at assisting the parties to arrive at agreement or
to step in when negotiations have broken down.87 Unfortunately, however,
these devices have also proved inadequate.
Mediation or conciliation is one form of assistance given to the
disputing parties. It is effectuated by the addition of an impartial third
party. Since the mediator is voteless, however, his sole tool is persuasion."8
83. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
84. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 494-95 (1960). For an
excellent discussion of recent Supreme Court labor law decisions, see Hays, The Supreme
Court and Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1960).
85. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
86. Id. at 500.
87. For a discussion of emergency provisions of Taft-Hartley, see note 3 supra
and related text.
88. See Mills, The Role of Mediation in Collective Bargaining, 23 TENN. L. R.v.
146 (1954).
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In this capacity, the mediator attempts to persuade the parties to employ
reason rather than force in resolving their differences. One commentator
has noted the severe limitations of mediation by stating, "It can serve
well only if the parties are disposed to let it do so."89 The difficulty
would seem, to be that if one party had a superior bargaining position,
he may think that mediation would rob him of his advantage. Consequently,
such a party may have no desire to replace "force with reason."
The Taft-Hartley Act indirectly encourages arbitration as another device
in settling disputes1i° Arbitration entails the addition of a third party
who sits as a judge. The vast majority of collective bargaining contracts
make arbitration the terminal step in grievance procedure. 1 Arbitration
has proved a valuable device as far as it goes. However, those issues
which vitally affect the public interest are rarely submitted to arbitration.
For example, only about two percent of the requests for arbitration panels
received by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service involved the
terms of future contracts. 92
In past years, the federal government has resorted to plant seizure
when collective bargaining has failed. 93 However, today, the power of the
President to use this device as a means of intervention appears dubious
since the decision of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.94 As the
Court stated:
The power of Congress to adopt such public policies . . . is
beyond question. It can authorize the taking of private property
for public use. It can make laws regulating the relationships
between employers and employees, prescribing rules designed to
settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions in
certain fields of our economy. The constitution does not subject
this law-making power of Congress to presidential ...supervision
or control.9 5
Related to plant seizure is the process of an employee draft. Under
this plan, the workers of a striking plant would become employees of
the government and, thus, unable to strike. One drawback of this plan
would be the fact that it would not take effect until after the public
interest had been injured by a work stoppage. One additional difficulty
89. Cole, Government in the Bargaining Process: The Role of Mediation, 333
Annals 42, 58 (1961).
90. LMRA § 203(c) encourages arbitration by providing that if FMCS fails to
settle the dispute it should induce the parties to seek other means for settling the
dispute. Section 301(a) produces similar results by permitting damage suits for breach
of labor-management agreements. See generally Bennett, The General Legal Status of
Labor Arbitration, 1 So. TEX. L.J. 26 (1954).
91. See Davey, Labor Arbitration; A Current Appraisal, 9 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 85
(1955).
92. Id. at 89.
93. See generally Federal Seizure in Labor Management Disputes, 1917-1952, 76
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 611 (1953).
94. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
95. Id. at 588.
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with establishing this plan is the fact that Congress once refused President
Truman's request for this power. 8
PART III
PRESENT INADEQUACIES SUGGEST CREATIVE DUE PROCESS OF ECONOMY
Historically, the field of industrial relations has now completed the
circle. Contrary to the time when the concern was over the huge power
of big business, today, a substantial portion of the literature in the field
argues that labor unions have become too powerful for the general good.97
Much of labor's power can be attributed to statutory immunities9 granted
over the years and to favorable administrative and judicial construction. 9
Dean Roscoe Pound has stated that the administrative agencies have:
along with the legitimate function of assuring equality in collective
bargaining between employer and employee and securing the
rights of employees in that relation, have also acquired a function
of upholding immunities of labor organizations and their leaders
at the expense of the public. They do not protect the public.
In such matters as procedure in 'violation of the antitrust laws,
restraint of trade and interference with commerce, security of
private property, and the right to work, they protect labor organiza-
tions and labor leaders against the public.100
Relevant statistics reveal the phenomenal growth of labor unions. In 1900,
less than one million workers in a national labor force of twenty-nine
million were union members. 10 1 By 1958, approximately 18.1 million
workers were union members.10 2 Moreover, union wealth in the form
of union welfare and pension plans has been estimated at nearly 34 billion
dollars.103
As discussed supra,104 the legislative history and specific amendments
of the Taft-Hartley Act make it clear that the premise of the act is a
96. President Truman, in connection with the railroad strike of 1946, asked
Congress for legislation which would enable him to induct striking employees into the
army, 92 CONC. REC. 5753 (1949). Also see Gebhert, 30 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 16 (1945)
for a plan which combines government seizure and draft.
97. See, e.g., Pound, Legal Immunities of Labor Unions, in CHAMBERLIN, LABOR
UNIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 122 (1958).
98. See textual discussion accompanying footnote 22 supra.
99. In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), restraints of trade by
organized violence were held to be exempt from federal prosecution. The Supreme Court
declared that the Clayton Act immunized that violation from the Sherman Act. In
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Norris-La Guardia Act was said
to have expanded the Clayton Act immunity. See also Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local
Union 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). This line of cases, in effect, has construed the
Norris-La Guardia and Clayton Acts as a pro tanto repeal of the Sherman Act.
100. Pound, supra note 97, at 171.
101. Clague, The American Worker and American Industry, 71 MONTHLY LABOR
REV. 11 (1950).
102. Cohany, Union Membership 1958, 83 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 4 (1960).
103. Levitan, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 9 LAB. L.J. 827, 828 (1958).
104. See textual discussion accompanying footnote 69 supra.
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general conviction that the growing power of the unions should be
curtailed. This regulation of labor organizations was extended after the
disclosures of the McClellan Committee.105 These highly publicized investiga-
tions of corruption and coercion in unions were the motivating forces
behind the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)
of 1959.106
The Landrum-Griffin Act, Title VII, deals with amendments to the
Taft-Hartley Act. It deals with the problems of federal-state jurisdiction, 0 7
picketing, secondary boycotts, "hot cargo" agreements, and the status of
economic strikes in representative elections. Secretary of Labor Goldberg,
in conjunction with Kenneth Meiklejohn, concluded that Title VII of
LMRDA is:
unfair and weighted against labor in important respects. This
is largely the result of the questionable procedures developed in
an atmosphere of intense emotion and propaganda which were
followed in securing the inclusion of anti-labor, rather than anti-
corruption, provisions in the act.108
The other segment of the act marks a new era in the legal regulation
of the internal affairs of unions. The purpose, essentially, is to insure union
democracy. Congress explicitly protected union members in the free exercise
of those political rights necessary for self-government. 09 Freedom of
speech and assembly and equal rights are now "guaranteed" to union
members. The same is true of the right of access to the civil courts, to
sue and to testify. Also provided are limitations on the execution of fees,
assessments, the collection of dues, and safeguards against improper
disciplinary action.
Few non-partisans would dissent from the view that legal restraints
were needed to curb the abuses of some powerful labor organizations.
Unfortunately, there is evidence that these recent legislative enactments
have failed to accommodate the complicated nature of our labor structure.
The nation needed a discriminating amendment which would eliminate
105. For an inside view of the proceedings of the McClellan Committee, see
KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN (1960). See also PETRO, POWER UNLIMITED: THE
CORRUPTION OF UNION LEADERSHIP (1959).
106. 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 187, 401-531 (Supp. 1959); see
generally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARv. L. REV. 851, 1086 (1960); Cox, Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Acts, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1959); Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 1959: A Symposium, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 659 (1960).
107. The question of federal pre-emption has provoked widespread controversy. While
it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze this aspect of labor law, it should be
noted that this problem underlies the proposal for Due Process of Economy. For
competent discussions, see Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction
Over Labor Relations, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 6, 269 (1959); Cox, Federalism in the Law
of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954).
108. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, Title VII; Taft-Hartley Amendments with Emphasis
on the Legislative History, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 747, 781 (1960).
109. See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact,
69 YALE L.J. 175 (1960), for a line of New York cases dealing with internal union disputes.
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the abuses of some large,, powerful unions and, at the same time, aid
newly organized and unorganized workers. Instead, Congress passed unselec-
tive acts which impose obligations on all concerted activity. Solicitor-
General Cox has stated:
The change of policy [behind the Taft-Hartley Act] appears to
be based on the belief that labor unions have become so strong
that legislative action was required to redress the balance of power
in the collective bargaining process. But it is not the unions
with crushing economic power that will feel this change; it is
the unorganized employees and the weak, newly-organized locals." 0
The Landrum-Griffin Act may be criticized for the same reasons
Solicitor-General Cox has criticized the Taft-Hartley Act. Although the
ethical practices of small unions have not been questioned, the Landrum-
Griffin Act may affect these organizations more than those big unions
whose practices have been investigated. The cause of such an effect would be
the fact that the larger unions can retain lawyers to manage their affairs."'
Furthermore, at least one writer has noted that Title VII provisions
would not only adversely affect small unions but small employers as well.
12
Another inconsistency of the present statutory scheme is that govern-
ment employees, who are not permitted to strike, have no alternate
machinery for presenting their demands to their employer, the government.
Professor Gregory highlights this inadequacy when he writes:
Surely we all agree that government employees cannot be allowed
to strike. Congress recognizes this in the Taft-Hartley Act simply
by flat prohibition and the punishment of individual strikers.
But Congress surely ought to practice some of what it preaches
and imposes on others, at least by substituting a procedure where
organized government employees could present demands and have
-them arbitrated. 13
Empirical data seems to indicate the need for a new legislative scheme
which would afford more adequate protection for the unorganized and
weak unions. This data reveals that the proportion of the national income
earned by the working class has remained substantially constant during
the rising years of the labor unions.'' 4 During the same period, impressive
gains have been made by some of the stronger unions with better bargaining
positions. These facts lead to the conclusion that such gains have been
made at the expense of workers who are unorganized or who belong
to weaker unions.
110. Cox, supra note 76, at 44-45.
111. See Taft, The Im pact of Landrunm-Griffin on Union Government, 333 Annals
130 (1961).
112. See Sbils, Inpact of Landrum-Criffin on the Smal Eniployier, 333 Annals 141(1961).
113. Grcgory, Introduction to Symposium, 35 NOTRE DANiE LAW. 592, 593 (1960).
114. Kerr, Labor's Share and the Labor Movement, in TAYLOR & PIERSON, NEW
CONCEPTS IN WAGE 1)ETEIR.INATION 260, 280-81 (1957).
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PART IV
JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND "THE NEW FRONTIER"
As outlined supra, the proposal of a new statutory scheme rests on
the Due Processes of Economy, the application of the due process, or
"fair plays" of the law to industrial disputes by the proposed United
States Economy Court. The public interest is the paramount standard
that would permeate all determinations of labor-management proceedings
before this court. The primary consideration always would be given to
the sound values of the liberties of self-determination in disputes or
relations between management and labor. It is apparent that public
interest is inseparable from the public aspects of a national emergency,
and at all times the court would be aware of the strong political pressures
which are present in a desirable or undesirable settlement. At no time
would this court negate the importance of the union weapon of a strike.
But free collective bargaining within the framework of judicial economic
standards would abhieve basic formulations for reducing the pressures on
both labor and management. Similarly, pressures would be minimized on
the government which is essentially involved as one of the necessary
parties disputant.
The court would be comprised of three judges, sitting en banc. Each
would be trained in economies and assisted by economists who would be
full-time appointees. The court would also have the power to appoint
amicus curiae and the public interest would be represented by a special
assistant attorney-general from the Department of Labor to present
its viewpoint. Under this system, a charge of an unfair labor practice
during the term of a contract would not justify the use of the intimidating
aspects of economic or extra-legal pressures. The same would be true of
any dispute arising from the interpretation or modification of a labor-
management agreement.
In these situations, either side could initiate a complaint in the
United States Economy Court not less than ninety days prior to the
expiration date of any agreement or, in the event of an original situation,
would be required to file a complaint charging the absence of good faith
in collective bargaining.
In a free enterprise system, the dominant value of the individual
freedom not to work, exercised in concert with others, is a basic liberty
that should not be curtailed lightly. 114a The court would respect the
sophisticated fact that the regulation of labor organizations by the Congress,
in order to accomplish the objective of a free flow of commerce, is
distinctive from the other voluntary unincorporated associations of a
social, fraternal, or religious nature. While it is the American public
114a. Horlacher, A Political Science View of National Emergency Disputes, 333
Annals 86 (1961).
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policy not to impair the liberties in collective bargaining and in labor-
management agreements, a public "bill of rights" should prevail in the
judicial determination of any dispute. A dispute between the parties
may well result in damages being awarded with a view to compensating
the injured party and deterring similar conduct in the future.
The significance of advocating a court rather than an administrative
board is that the immediacy of the enforcement of a court order could
be implemented by summary contempt proceedings and also by the
sanctions of imprisonment or fine. In addition, there would be the
mandatory and restraining injunctive relief.
In the event the court found or ordered that a national emergency
dispute was involved between the parties, the court would have summary
powers to restrain either side to such time as the dispute or contract
differences could be determined. In the past, the courts have shown little
imagination in creating remedial orders which might preserve some of the
values of the due process rule, and yet not leave management or labor
unprotected. The power of the United States Economy Court would afford
judicial protection against oppressive union disciplines or similar manage-
ment conduct and would become meaningful only to the extent that
effective remedies were practically available. There must not be any
delay involved in obtaining judicial protection for either side. Furthermore,
the costs of litigation would have to be minimized and the length of
litigation should be resolved within short order.
Moreover, if no agreement had been reached six months after the
termination of a collective bargaining contract, the parties would appear
before the United States Economy Court for a judicial determination.
During the six month period, and during the judicial proceedings, the
use of economic pressures would be eliminated and the employees would
continue to work under the terms of the old contract. Until the initiation
of judicial proceedings, labor and management would be encouraged to
settle their disputes. The existing devices, such as conciliation and arbitra-
tion, would remain at their disposal. Presumably, an inclination for
settlement out of court would provide the parties with the incentive to
give these ancillary devices a fair chance to operate.
As in any other judicial proceedings, the court would entertain oral
and written arguments. Similarly, interested parties could present amicus
curiae briefs. The court's decision would bind both parties, and traditional
contempt of court proceedings would be available against any party who
attempted to defy the court. Judicial appeal would, of course, be available.
In addition, this proposal would specify that the statutory provisions and
rules applicable to the existing federal courts would apply to the United
States Economy Court. However, these new courts would be given
discretionary power to modify inappropriate rules.
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This plan would not inhibit the privileges of the individual because
each worker would remain free to quit work. Hence, there would be
no violation of the thirteenth amendment. However, provision should be
made that anyone ceasing work would do so under the customary conditions
of a permanent termination of employment. Any concerted withdrawal
from work, amounting to work-stoppages, would be unlawful. On the
assumption that such mass activity is rarely spontaneous, the court could
impose penalties on those who were responsible for such action.
Even as due process is the analytical tool which courts employ in
bringing fairness to bear on situations in other areas of the law, so the
Due Process of Economy would operate in the field of labor relations.
Thus, it would be well suited for deciding job security issues arising
from automation. The New York Times reported that the recent New
York harbor strike, "provided fresh evidence . .. that worries over job
security, not wages, would be the chief labor-management hurdle on the
road to the New Frontier."'1 5 Historically, the collective bargaining process
was not designed to meet problems crucially affecting the public interest.
Consequently, it appears that the solutions to the problems raised by these
issues should be formulated in the dry light of the judicial process rather
than in the arena of economic muscle.
Some critics could claim that a drawback of this proposal would
be setting a standard for the determination of wage issues. However, such
a task should actually be simpler than that confronting an administrative
agency in ascertaining consumer rates and a fair return on capital to
investors in public utilities. Admittedly, this is a difficult task. However,
such a task had to be undertaken in this area to protect the public just
as it must be protected in the field of labor-management relations. More-
over, the setting of standards for public utilities appears more difficult
than settling wage disputes; for in the former situation, the administrative
agency is presented with unilateral demands. In the latter case, wage
determinations would be made in the context of a wage dispute which
included boundaries set by the proposals of both parties. Labor and
management would not be unlike adversaries in a tort case where the
issue might be the value of an arm or a leg. Both would present their
arguments on the matter, and the court would, in effect, be limited by
their alternatives. In either event, the court would be compelled to weigh
the merits and arrive at a conclusion based on fairness.
The effects of the Due Process of Economy would be manifold. It
would assure the United States industrial stability since all forms of
coercive economic pressures would be prohibited. Instead, labor-management
disputes would be settled by the parties themselves with the assistance
of third parties as they may decide. And in the event of a prolonged
115. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1961, § E, p. 12.
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stalemate, the United States Economy Court would make a judicial
determination in the best interests of the United States public. Furthermore,
it would promote fair dealings between the parties. The use of coercive
power, however subtle or direct, by both unions and management would
be curtailed. When weak unions, unorganized workers or small employers
arc confronted by powerful adversaries, they would not need to succumb
to economic muscle power. Instead, they would have the protection of
the courts. Moreover, the effects of the Due Process of Economy would
extend to groups, such as government employees, who do not benefit
from the existing legislative scheme.
The relatively high degree of strike activity in the United States
threatens the inspired hope of President John F. Kennedy's "New Frontier"
for national strength, safety, international acceptance and social and
industrial welfare. Governmental regulation of collective bargaining, the
resort to eighty-day injunctive periods when strikes and lockouts seriously
threaten the national health or safety, falls far short of the determinant
rule of law established by a judicial-economic tribunal relying upon the
evidentiary evaluation of economic factors relating to the needs, demands
and projected requirements of labor and capital. By 1970, a 20 percent
increase in the labor force has been forecast."" By the year 2000, a
population of 200,000,000 is conservatively estimated with a 60 percent
labor force increase over the decade increase of 1960-1970. Special problems,
economic and labor-personnel with increased union membership will make
present coercive collective bargaining methods archaic and dangerously
perilous.
The very survival of the United States and its free world allies may
very likely depend upon a sustained economic social structure with rare
aud exceptional work stoppages pursuant to and permissible only by an
order of the United States Economy Court. The power of one man or
group of men to force a large disciplined body of men to take action
against their will11 7 would be a denial of due process of economy and
branded as obsolescent under this rule of law.
116. Estey, The Impact of Labor Force Changes on Labor Relations, 333 Annals 1
(1961). See also U.S. DEI,'T OF LABOI, MANPOWER - CALLIENGE OF THE 1960's (1960).
117. Henly, A Union Viewpoint, 333 Annals 5, 10 (1961).
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